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Abstract—So  called  “apps”  are  widespread  today  on  the
Internet.  Most  of  them  allow  users  to  extend  the  range  of
functionalities  their  websites  offer.  However,  they  potentially
jeopardize the privacy of users.  Indeed, they collect,  store and
process personal pieces of information. Recent studies show that
users feel they lack control over information. They also show that
users  distrust  apps  providers  and  would  rather  turn  to  their
friends  or  family  when  they  choose  apps.  In  this  paper  we
propose a model-driven approach to empower end-users with an
extended  control  over  their  information.  Our  work  is
implemented as a web-based tool to compose apps and manage
end-users  privacy  requirements.  Our  work  showcases  the
unexploited  possibilities  of  current  web  protocols  and
technologies in terms of privacy management. 
Keywords—Privacy,  Model-driven  Engineering,  Web
Applications, end-user programming
I.  INTRODUCTION
Web applications are part of our lives. With more than 1.2
billions of users, Facebook, for instance, is everywhere. Most
web applications, be them social networks, musics services or
software code repositories – are “social”. They allow users to
interact  and  enhance  their  experience  with the  one of  other
users.  Most  of  these  applications  also allow users  to  install
third  party  applications.  For  instance,  Candy Crush Saga,  a
well-known online game, is available on Facebook and gathers
more than 150 millions of users.
Social  features  and third party applications are important
factors in the success of current web applications, a flourishing
economic  sector.  However,  they  also  generate  fears.  Recent
surveys show that users feel they are loosing control over their
data [5][7]. As a result, they do not trust applications providers
when it comes to managing their data, especially when they are
sensitive. Such feelings are a brake to the acceptance of new
applications. They may result in less sharing among users or
suing and boycott  of  some applications.  They demand extra
attention to privacy management.
Tools are missing to address these feelings. In this paper we
address  this  lack.  We  focus  specifically  on  privacy
management in third-party applications use. We diagnose two
causes to the feeling of lack of control that users express. First
of all, users cannot freely chose the third party apps they want
to work with. They can only select the applications developed
for a specific platform – such as Facebook. Secondly,  when
users  select  an  application,  they  can  usually  access  the
application's  privacy  policy.  However,  this  policy  is  often
unclear  or  incomplete.  Thus,  users  cannot  actually  make an
informed  consent  when  it  comes  to  selecting  a  third-party
application. 
This problem is at the center of many current debates. For
instance, in august 2013, groups of private life defenders sued
Facebook. The company agreed to pay 20 millions dollars for
using  members  "likes"  as  endorsements  for  advertising,  and
also to modify its rules to "give members greater control when
it comes to how their information is used"1. In France, at the
same time, a consumer organization says about Google, Twitter
and Facebbok that  they record, store and process  all  private
information  of  their  users2.  In  january  2014,  Google  was
ordered to pay 150,000 euros by a french government office for
its  policy  about  data  confidentiality3.  In  United  Kingdom,
according to a survey, 92% of adult users feel uncomfortable
when sharing personal data on social networks, while 55% are
feeling  more  comfortable  when  sharing  these  data  with
governmental institutions,  showing that the problem really is
about  private  sector  companies4.  Researchers  also  notice  an
increasing reluctance to share personal data[7].
As a result, empowering users with means to better control
their data diffusion is essential to foster the acceptance of web
applications. Users must be provided with relevant information
– they must now who uses the application for instance – and be
able to  express fine-grained access  control  requirements.  It's
challenging. It demands to retrieve a large amount of data and
to  accommodate  the  lack  of  end-users'  technical  expertise.
Most  current  works  on  privacy  management  in  application
composition  are  dedicated  to  expert  users  and  are  thus
irrelevant  to  our  problem.  On  the  other  hand,  end-user
programming is a promising way of research but has not be
applied to privacy management.
In order  to leverage this  difficulty,  we propose a model-
driven approach divided in two levels:
1 http://tinyurl.com/kqdvmg8
2 http://tinyurl.com/lj5788o
3 http://tinyurl.com/ln5dcpp
4 http://tinyurl.com/l3z5vrj
Fig. 1. Composing web applications to edit online pictures
• The configuration level allows end-users to describe
the composition of a set of applications and the access
rights to their data. Users rely on information provided
by the developers of the applications. The specification
level provides a metamodel divided in two parts. The
technical  part  provides  developers with vocabulary to
describe their applications. The nontechnical part frees
end-users from technical details. 
• The  implementation  level  allows  to  run  the
composition of application. It relies on code generation
to produce the composition and the access control code.
Automated code generation addresses the lack of end-
users  technical  expertise:  they  do  not  have  to  write
code.
Our main contributions are twofold. First, we bring a
metamodel  to  specify  a  privacy-conscious composition of
web applications. Then, we propose an execution platform
for  this  metamodel  to  execute  the  specifications  of  end-
users while addressing their lack of technical expertise.
Our  work  is  implemented  as  a  website  which  allows  to
compose  web  applications  and  specify  access  rights.  This
website is realized with the same technologies as the ones most
current web application use. It aims at showcasing that these
technologies  allow  to  manage  privacy  more  accurately  than
what is currently done. We apply our website to a real use case
in order to demonstrate our approach's feasibility. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our
use case. In Section 3, we draw a state of the art in order to
identify  the  lacks  in  current  works.  Section  4  introduces  a
global outlook over our approach. In Section 5, we detail our
metamodel,  its  layers  and  the  way  we  configure  web
applications to compose them. Section 6 outlines our execution
level.  Eventually,  we presentation our results and our work's
validation in Section 7 before discussing our contribution in
Section 8.
II. USE CASE
In this paper, we posit that a user wants to edit and print
pictures from his/her social network profile. Applications to do
so already exist. Their composition is represented as a process
on Figure 1. Users may edit pictures stored on a social network
(here Facebook) with an online editor (here Pho.to) and print
them (here with Pwenty) while paying for this service with an
online bank account (here Paypal) and send the pictures to an
online  address  book  (here  Gmail).  However  current  web
application do not allow end users to run this process while
protecting their privacy for the following reasons:
• Each application is produced by a specific provider.
Users have to authenticate each time they interact with
an  application  either  with  an  account  issued  by  the
application or associated to it. For instance, users can
login  to  the  printing  application  with  their  social
network account. This feature is called “single sign on”
(users  sign  on  multiple  applications  with  a  single
account).
• Applications  rely  on  the  same  types  of  data.  For
instance,  three  out  of  the  applications  we  consider
process photos. However, they represent and describe
these data types with specific vocabulary. A common
vocabulary  to  connect  applications  which  process
pictures – for instance – is missing. 
• The composition processes sensitive data. Photos can
display  intimate  scenes  and  banking  information  are
especially sensitive. When an application gains access
to  these  data,  users  loose  control  over  what  the
application will do. For instance, it may sell the data to
its business partners. As a result, users should be able to
finely control the datasets they share – by restricting the
range of the set – and the life time of the access rights.
It is currently impossible.
• Binding the  applications requires  code.  This  code is
currently realized by developers each time they want to
connect  two applications.  End-users  cannot  connect
two  applications  if  such  code  does  not  exist.  For
instance, there is no connection between Facebook and
Pho.to.  Thus,  users  cannot  process  their  Facebook
pictures with Pho.to.
In our work, we strive to answer these difficulties in order
to  allow  the  end-users  to  compose  web  applications  while
protecting  their privacy of end-users.  
III. STATE OF THE ART
This  section  presents  how  composing  web  applications
while enforcing privacy is presented in literature.
A. Composing web applications
 Mainstream  web  applications  are  often  realized  as
Representational  State Transfer (REST) services  [13].  REST
presents itself as a software architecture style whose structure
is an abstraction of the world wide web. It sees this structure as
a  distributed  resource  management  system.  Anything with a
name  –  a  picture,  a  person  or  a  bank  account  –  can  be  a
resource [13]. REST services are web services. However they
are  distinct  from  traditional  web  services  defined  by  [10].
Traditional  service-oriented  architectures  focus  on  the
functionalities  of  services  and their  selection.  REST,  on  the
contrary focuses on searching and processing resources.
As a result, there is no mainstream composition language
for REST services. Traditional service composition languages,
such  as  the  Business  Process  Execution  Language (BEPL),
needs  extensions  to  accomodate  REST services  [1][11][13].
Actually, BEPL relies on languages such as the Web Service
Description Language (WSDL) or the Simple Object  Access
Protocol  (SOAP)  which  are  different  from  the  Hypertext
Transfer Protocol which the REST architecture uses.
Extensions  to  BEPL are  only  suitable  for  expert  users.
Indeed,  end-users  are  accustomed  to  web  pages  and  rich
interfaces. Thus, REST services composition is often displayed
as a mash up. [8] shows that the composition of web services
relies on API and resources identified by Universal Resource
Identifiers (URI). Authors underline that such a composition is
ad hoc. Developers write code to bind specific applications but
a generic  framework to connect applications is missing. 
Eventually, user-centered tools, such as Really Simple
Syndication (RSS) feeds aggregator – such as Yahoo!Pipes –
allow end-users to compose RSS feeds produced by a set of
applications. However, such tools do not allow users to modify
the feeds by publishing a new message or uploading a new
picture for instance. 
B. Protecting privacy in web applications
Composing  web  applications  implies  sharing  sensitive
pieces of data. When applications gain access to such data, it
becomes impossible to control  what they do. They may sell
data for instance. As a result, access control is crucial. In REST
there exist security protocols which permit to authenticate users
and  applications  and  control  and  applications  permissions.
Oauth5 is the most used protocol. Most of the time, when a user
wants to share his/her data with a third party application, a pop
up  appears  and  asks  the  user  to  review  the  third-party
application's permissions. Figure 2 displays an example of such
a pop up for Gmail6. 
Fig. 2.  Pop up to accept the use of a third party application.
Yet, the implementation of protocols such Oauth may turn
them inefficient [14].  Sometimes they allow hackers to steal
the  identity  of  users.  Moreover,  the  confirmation  phase  is
crucial.  It  allows  users  to  review  the  pieces  of  data  the
5 http://oauth.net/2/
6 http://gmail.com
TABLE I. COMPARISON OF THIRD PARTY APPLICATION CONTROL MEANS IN FIVE WEB APPLICATIONS 
Application Deezer Facebook Google Twiiter GitHub
Authentication Oauth 2.0
Documentation
http://tinyurl.co
m/888a82e
http://tinyurl.co
m/phcf7kg
http://tinyurl.com/phcf
7kg
http://tinyurl.com/888a8
2e
http://tinyurl.com/nbp3zyr
Users must consent to use
third-party application
Yes
Third-party application
Identity
Name, logo
Third-party application
description
No Optional
Provider contact Non eEmail Website
Customization of access rights No
Permission description List of accessed data List of what the application can and can't do List of what the application can do
Level of detail in the
description
Low.  No  list  of  what  the
application  can  do  with  data.
Vague terms. 
High High
Low.  No  description  of  the  accessed
data
Other information No Privacy policy No
application want to  access  and the effect  of  such a sharing.
However, each web application implements this confirmation
phase in its own way. Users may not get all the information
they need to make an informed consent or this information may
be unclear or imprecise. Table 1 compares the information five
web applications  provide users  with when they  want  to  use
third party applications. 
The  five  applications  use  Oauth  2  a  security  protocol.
However, Oauth is only a specification. Each application has
its  own  implementation  of  the  protocol.  All  the  application
allows  users  to  review  the  permissions  the  third-party
application they want to use requests. No application allows
users to restrict the set of data they grant access to. Eventually,
some descriptions are vague. For instance,  users  are warned
they grand access to their Facebook “public profile” without
the definition of this profile being outlined. Eventually, some
pieces  of  information  are  missing.  Surveys  [5][7]  show that
users  rely  on  people  close  to  them  to  trust  third  party
applications.  No  application  provide  users  with  information
about who uses the third party application they want to use.
C. Model-driven security, a promising solution
Web applications process the same type of resources. For
instance,  most  social  networks  store  instant  messages.
However,  each  application  has  a  specific  representation  of
these  resources.  Furthermore,  each  application  relies  on  a
specific  implementation  of  security  and  implementation
protocols.  Most  of  the  time,  the  binding  between  two  web
applications  is  ad  hoc:  developers  create  code  for  specific
applications and have to realize this for each application they
want to bind their application to.
In Service-Oriented Applications, abstract languages allow
to  focus  on  services  functionalities  and  not  on  their
implementation  to  compose  them  through  a  model-driven
approach [2]. A metamodel  provides the vocabulary necessary
to describe the composition of a set of functionalities. Model to
code transformations allow to generate the code necessary to
run  the  service  composition.  Model-driven  engineering  also
allows to specify at an abstract level security features such as
access  control  and  generate  the  code  to  enforce  an  access
control  policy [4],  [16].  Such a policy is efficient to protect
priacy [4]. 
However, these approaches are dedicated to expert  users.
[3]  shows that  process  languages  are  too  complex  for  end-
users.  The  author  shows  that   identifying  abstraction  levels
allows to gather people with different levels of expertise, such
as end-users or developers. Eventually, the author shows that a
concrete  syntax  is  necessary  to  help  end-users  capture  a
process. 
Modeling  is  at  the  heart  of  end-user  programming.
However, an approach which reconciles end-user specifications
and  technical  details  in  order  to  run  a  privacy  aware
composition of web applications is missing. 
D. Conclusion to the state of the art
Composing Rest services remains complex and end-users
cannot do it. Furthermore, users lack tools to configure their
data diffusion. As a result,  users feel they lack control  over
their data. Existing solutions do not address these fears. In the
rest  of  this  paper,  we  present  a  model-driven  approach  to
empower users with control over their data in web applications
IV. GLOBAL APPROACH
Our goal is to allow end-users to process their data with any
web  application  while  protecting  their  privacy.  We want  to
allow users to share their data between a set of applications
while controlling their diffusion and the access rights of each
application.  To do so,  we propose  a  model-driven  approach
whose global structure is presented on Figure 3. This approach
allows end-users to specify the applications they want to use
and the datasets they allow these applications to access. End-
users  do  not  have  to  deal  with  technical  complexities.  We
provide them with high level descriptions of applications and
access rights. This description is extracted from an application's
description.  This  description  is  written  by  the  application's
developer. It describes the application's functionalities. It also
specifies  the  data  the  application  needs  to  access.  Such  a
description often contains numerous technical  details  and its
vocabulary is not adapted for end-users. Thus, the viewpoint of
end-users and the view point of developers must be reconciled.
To achieve this goal, our approach is generative and divided
in two levels:
• At  the  configuration  level,  end-users  specify  the
resources they want to process and how they want to
process  them.  By doing  so,  they  implicitly  specify  a
composition of web applications. They also specify the
access rights to their data.  In order to guide end-users,
we propose a metamodel which provides the necessary
vocabulary  to  express  without  technical  details  the
resources  the  user  wants  to  share,  the  actions  he/she
wants  to  perform  on  it  and  the  access  rights  to  the
resources.  Our metamodel  is  divided in two views, a
resource  view  and  an  access  control  one.  As  this
metamodel  must  be  available  to  end-users  and
developers  also  and  as  they  do  not  have  the  same
expertise,  we  design  two  abstraction  layers  for  our
metamodel.  The most  abstract  level  does  not  contain
technical  details.  End-users  can  use  this  layer  of
abstraction.  The  technical  layer  of  our  metamodel
allows developers to describe their applications. As end-
users are used to rich interfaces, we pay a great deal of
attention to the concrete syntax of our metamodel. This
syntax  is  inspired  by  web  applications  in  order  to
remain coherent with the usual experience of end-users. 
• The implementation level of our work permits to bind
the  applications  and  process  the  relevant  data  while
enforcing  privacy  protection.  This  level  relies  on
composition  code  which  invokes  the  different
applications and ensures  their  communication.  It  also
relies on access control code with describes the access
rights of an application and its properties. All the code
is  automatically  generated  from  the  specifications  of
end-users. Thus, end-users do not have to write software
code. 
Fig. 4. Non technical metamodel
Fig. 3. Overview of our approach
V.  DETAILED APPROACH
In  this  part,  we  enter  into  the  details  of  our  work.  We
present our metamodel and its two levels of abstraction: a non-
technical levl for end-users and a technical one for developers.
A. Non technical level: metamodel for end-users
End-users do not have technical expertise. We propose an
abstraction  level  of  our  metamodel  which  matches  the
vocabulary they are used to on the web. This level is displayed
on Figure 4. 
1) Metamodel entities
The metamodel gathers the following entities: 
• A resource is anything which can be named. A picture,
an email or a user are example of resources. Resources
are identified by their name.
• Each  resource  as  a  type.  A type  has  a  name.  User,
Picture or Message are examples of types. 
• A resource possesses a set of properties which permits
to describe it. For instance, a picture has a name and it
may belong to an album. 
• A resource is associated to actions: it can be created,
updated or deleted. 
• An  application  is  a  software  which  stores,  creates,
processes and modifies resources. A social networking
site  or  an  online  media  player  are  examples  of
applications. For a given resource, an application can be
a  source  –  it  stores  resource  –  or  a  third-party
application:  it  seeks  to  retrieve  and process  the  data.
Sources  and  third-party  applications  have  a  privacy
policy.  This policy is a string which describes data it
stores and the way it processes this data.
• An  application  is  created  and  made  available  by  a
provider.  A provider  possesses  a name,  an email  and
contact information such as a website.
• In order to use an application, a user must possess an
account which stores information such as a login and a
password. An account may be issued by an application
and used to connect to another application in order to
allow single sign on. For instance,  a  user  may use a
photo  sharing  service  with  his/her  social  network
account. 
• When  the  application  plays  the  role  of  third-party
application  towards  an  resource,  it  must  gain  the
necessary  permissions  to  consume  the  resource  it
needs, i.e. to perform actions on the resource it needs.
For  instance,  deleting  a  picture  on  a  user  social
network  profile  may  require  special  privileges.
Permissions  can  be  constrained  according  to  a
resource's properties. For instance, a user may grant a
permission to  update only the pictures in  the family
album.
2) Concrete syntax
Users are accustomed to graphic syntax and rich interface.
In  order  to  foster  the  acceptance  of  our  work,  we  build  a
concrete syntax. Table II displays this concrete syntax.
Table II Metamodel's concrete syntax
Metamodel entity Concrete Syntax Example
Application Logo
Provider Text or icon
Account Text Bank account
Resource Text or icon
Action Text Get
Functionality Text Edit photo
Permission Text Can read
B. Application to our use case
We now instantiate our metamodel for our use case from
the perspective of end-users. We add the following constraints
to the communication between the applications:
• To  retrieve  pictures  from  the  social  network,  an
application must have the “read pictures” permission.
• In order  to  access  a set  of  addresses,  an application
must have the “read addresses” permission.
• In order to request for a payment, an application must
possess the “get payment” permission.
These  permissions  are  inspired  from  real-world
applications. For instance, the Facebook application demands
an application to possess permissions to access datasets. For
instance,  accessing  a  user's  private  messages  requires  the
“read_mailbox”  permission.  Users  grant  these  permissions
when they review the data a third-party application accesses. 
Table  3  gives  an  overview  of  the  instances  of  our
metamodel's entities that we identify in our use case.
Table III Instances of our metamodel in our use case
Metamodel entity Use Case Instance
Application
Social network
Online photo editor
Address book
Photo editing service
Provider 
Facebook
Pho.to
Pwinty
Paypal
Gmail
Account
Social network account
Email account
Bank account
Resource
Photo
Edited photo
Address
Baking informations
Action
Get photos
Get baking information
Get addresses
Functionality
Photo edition
Photo printing
Permission
Can permanently read photos
Can read photos from the “family”
album
Can read once addresses from the
group “family”
Can read once banking information
Can read pictures
Can read addresses
Can get payment
Figure 4 displays a graphical representation of our use case
with our concrete syntax. 
Fig. 4 Graphical representation of our use case
Fig. 5. Technical metamodel
C. Technical level: metamodel for developers 
In order to generate the code to link a set of applications
and the  access  control  code,  we need  technical  information.
This code allows to invoke the functionalities of applications
and  to  retrieve  and  update  the  data  they  hold.  All  the
information  necessary  to  produce  this  code  is  provided  by
developers.  Currently,  such  information  lies  in  Application
Programming  Interfaces.  For  instance,  the  Graph  Api  –
Facebook's  programming  interface,  describes  Facebook's
available functionalities.
The technical model refines the nontechnical level. Figure 5
displays the technical metamodel. It adds technical information
to  the  concepts  we  have  already  identified.  We  refine  our
metamodel  with  concepts  from  Rest  architectures.  Such
information can be found in  [13] for  instance.  We also add
information for access control from single sign on protocols
such as Oauth. All the technical concepts are displayed in grey.
1) Metamodel entities
We now detail the information we add to our metamodel. 
In order to access a resource, we need identifiers. We thus
add Universal Resource Identifiers (URI) to resources.
According  to  Rest  architectures,  resources  have  several
representations.  For  instance,  a  picture  may  have  several
versions with several sizes and resolutions. Each representation
is  described  by  metadata.  A metadata  provides  information
about a resource. For instance, the “resolution” metadata gives,
for a picture, its resolution.
Web technologies  rely on “Internet  media  types”  (Mime
types)  which  define  the  types  of  data  applications  handle.
Mime types include image, text or video. We add Mime types
as implemented types to our “Type” class.
In Rest architectures, actions are basic HTTP actions. We
thus add three subclasses to our Action class, their definitions is
inspired by the HTTP protocol's specification:
• the Get action allows to retrieve any resource identified
by its URI. For Instance, “Get 012456” will return the
resource identified by the number  Get/012456.
• the Post  action permits  to  publish data  to  the  target
URI.  For instance,   “Post  012456” adds the resource
identified  by  the  number  012456  to  the  target
application. This method allows, for instance, to publish
new messages to a social network or upload pictures.
• the Delete actions allows to delete a resource identified
by its URI. For instance, “Delete 012456” deletes the
resource  identified  by  the  number  012456  from  the
target application.
We refine the association  between an application and an
action to add the notion of Application Programming Interface
(API). An action is part of an API. An application provides an
API. This API is used by third-party developers to discover the
application's  functionalities.  Each  API  has  a  Universal
Ressource Link (URL) and is written in a language such as
Java or Php.
Each  application  accommodates  one  or  several
authentication  methods.  For  instance,  an  application  may
require  a  login  and  a  password  or  allows  single  sign  on
protocols such as oAuth.
Eventually,  an  application  requires  security  properties.
Security properties allow an application to connect to another
application.  For  instance,  Facebook  requires  third-party
applications to possess an “application number” and a “shared
secret”.  Such  information  are  necessary  to  identify  and
authenticate  third-party  applications.  Third  party  application
Fig. 6. A request template
Fig. 7. Actual request to retrieve a picture on Facebook
must possess the security properties relevant to connect to the
application it targets.
2) Application to our use case
We now apply our technical metamodel to our use case. In
most cases, technical information are provided as textual API
by developers. We thus do not provide a graphic syntax to this
level of our metamodel. We stick to a textual syntax. For each
application in our use case,  we present  the instances of our
metamodel's  concepts.  We  only  present  the  technical
information for brevity reasons. 
Table IV displays our metamodel's instance for Facebook.
We only deal with getting pictures on Facebook. We extract
data from Facebook's API7.
Table IV Metamodel's instance for Facebook
Metamodel entity Use Case Instance
API
API's url: 
http://tinyurl.com/qf5n7gx
Languages: Javascript, PHP, etc.
Action Get/PhotoID
Resource: URI A number. Example : 119778565
Authentication method oAuth
Required Security Properties
Access token (permissions granted
to an application)
Application  secret  (allows
Facebook  to  identify  an
application)
Application Id (allows Facebook to
authenticate an application)
Table V displays  our metamodel's instance for Pho.to. We
extract all the information from Pho.to's Api8.
Table V Metamodel's instance for Pho.to
Metamodel entity Use Case Instance
API
API's url: 
http://tinyurl.com/o27cu89
Languages: HTTP
Action Get/use_auto_red_eye 
Resource: URI An Image URL
Authentication method Key issued by Pho.to.
Required Security Properties
Key (allows Pho.to to authenticate
an application).
Eventually, Table VI presents our metamodel's instance for
Pwinty. We extract all the information from Pwinty's Api9.
7 https://developers.facebook.com/docs/graph-api/‎
8 http://files.pho.to/documentation/editor-
platform/online_photo_enhancement_platform_api.htm#ite
m_4_2
9 http://www.pwinty.com/Overview
Table VI Metamodel's instance for Pwinty
Metamodel entity Use Case Instance
API
API's url: 
http://tinyurl.com/oodrcox
Languages: HTTP
Action
Post/Order (creates an order)
Post/Orders/{orderId}/Photos (adds
photos to an order)
Post/Orders/{orderId}/Status
(validates the order)
Resource: URI 
A number.  Example:  1605  is  an
order's URI.
Authentication method oAuth
Required Security Properties
X-Pwinty-MerchantId
X-Pwinty-REST-API-Key
All this information allows to call each application and its
functionalities when they are relevant to our use case. As we
want to automatically produce the code necessary to call each
application, we now describe our code generation process. 
D. Request templates for code generation
Code  generation  is  responsible  for  producing  the  code
necessary  to  invoke  each  application.  The  technical
information  allows  to  define  request  templates.  A  request
templates describes the generic form of a call to an application.
templates are  fed with actual information in order to invoke an
application.
Figure 6 displays the request template which describes the
generic request to retrieve a picture from Facebook:
When a specific application wants to retrieve a photo from
Facebook,  it  feeds  the  template  with  the  relevant  pieces  of
information. For instance, in order to retrieve the picture with
URI  “1265873”,  the  application  with  the  application  id
“178656”  and  the  access  token  “867567509”  will  issue  the
request displayed on Figure 7.
At the end of the configuration process, we have captured a
user's needs in terms of the composition of applications. We
have also captured the user's privacy preferences in terms of
data access.
We  now  present  our  implementation  level,  which  is
responsible  for  executing  the  captured  requirements  and
feeding our code templates with actual information.
VI. EXECUTION LEVEL
In our state of the art, we have identified the several lacks
in current web applications:
• Users can only  select  a  limited range of  third  party
applications. 
• Users  have  limited  control  over  data  third  party
applications access. 
• Users  are  not  provided  with  all  the  information
necessary to make an informed consent.
As we cannot modify mainstream web applications such as
Facebook  in  order  to  address  these  lacks,  we  propose  a
dedicated  architecture  to  execute  a  privacy  conscious  web
application composition. This phase relies on code generation
from the specification of users. 
Figure 8 gives an overview of our architecture. We can
identify three main components:
• Model  to  text  transformations  allow  to  turn  user's
requirements into code. They are responsible for linking
the  non-technical  models  of  an  end-user  to  technical
information necessary to run the desired composition.
• The  mediation  and  execution  engine  executes  the
privacy aware composition according to the generated
code.
• The  applications  repository  stores  the  description  of
the APIs of all the available applications.
We present each component in the rest of this section. 
1) Access control code generation process
According  to  a  user's  access  control  requirements  we
generate an access control token for an application. An access
control token is a piece of code which contains all the access
rights of an application for a specific set of resources. 
In order to generate the token, we rely on an access control
token template which describes the generic form of a token.
Figure 9 presents our access control token template. 
Our token contains the following elements: 
• A user id: the identifier of the current user.
• An  application  id:  the  identifier  of  the  third  party
application.
• Privileges:  a  set  of  pairs  :  <{property,  value},
resource>  which  describes  a  resource  a  third  party
application is granted access to and a set of values its
properties should have.
• Each token is associated with a lifetime which states
how many times the token is valid.
The token template is fed with information from an API
description  end-user's  access  control  requirements.  Figure  9
displays a token to restrict Pwinty's access to the pictures in the
“Family” album. 
2) Composition code generation process
Composing two applications necessitates  to call  a  source
application to retrieve its data and transmit the retrieved pieces
of data to a third party application. This transmission is itself a
request to the third party application. Thus each composition
phase  relies  on  two  request  templates:  one  for  a  source
application,  one  for  the  third  party  application.  Requests  to
retrieve data can only bear on allowed sets of resources. 
In order to link requests, we use variables: data necessary
retrieved  from  a  source  application  as  stored  in  a  variable
before their transmission to the third party application.
Once again, this phase relies on templates. Figure 10
displays the composition template.  This templates  is  used at
each step of the composition.
Fig. 8. Overview of our architecture
Fig. 9. Access token template
Fig. 10. Composition code template
Fig. 9. Composition code template
This template is fed with information from APIs
descriptions. It is also fed with an application access token in
order  to  ensure  that  a  third  party  application  only  accesses
allowed  sets  of  resources.  Figure  10  displays  a  part  of  the
composition code corresponding to our use case.
3) Composition execution and access control enforcement:
the mediation and execution engine
The  mediation  and  execution  engine  is  equivalent  to  an
orchestrator  in  Service-oriented  architectures.  It  permits  to
compose the applications while enforcing access control. To do
so, it calls the templates we have described, feeds them with
relevant  information  and  issues  requests  to  the  applications.
Implementation 
We have developed a prototype to allow users to specify the
composition of a set of applications and configure their access
control  preferences  for  each  application.  This  prototype
consists in a mash up of the applications an end-user actually
uses.  It has two main parts,  a web page, which provides an
interface  to  interact  with  end-users,  and  a  mediation  and
execution engine which runs the composition.
Figure  12  displays  the  interface  of  our  prototype.  The
interface contains the following elements:
• a menu presents  the resources  the applications  hold.
Such resources include pictures or friends. A contextual
menu allows,  for  each resource  to  perform an  action
with a dedicated application. For instance, a user may
chose  to  synchronize  a  set  of  pictures  with  his/her
dropbox or edit this set.
• When  the  user  wants  to  transfer  data  from  one
application to the other, a pop up asks the user to review
the access rights he/she grants the application. The user
may also restrict the datasets an application has access
to. 
Our  prototype  is  implemented  with  mainstream  web
technologies. The client-side are plain Javascript and HTML. 
The  mediation  and  execution  engine  is  written  in
Javascript. All the requests to the application are regular HTTP
requests rewritten to enforce access control. The mediation and
execution engine also stores a repository of all the applications
available to end-users. 
Our prototype aims at showcasing that access control can
be more finely enforced in web application. We bring two new
abilities to end-users. First, en users can restrict an application's
privileges. They can either select a subset of data an application
gets access to, or restrict the lifetime of a permission. Then, it
is customary in marketing to identify groups of similar users –
i.e.  users  who  share  the  same  interests  and  the  same
sociological  profile.  Identify these group allows to predict  a
user interests: users are likely to like and do what people who
look like them like and do. This sociological phenomenon is
called “assortativity”.
Surveys shows that  the same stands for applications use.
end-users  do not trust  service providers.  However they trust
people they feel are close to them and look like them to select
an application. However, as we have said, no web application
provides information about who uses a third-party application
when end-users have to review the access rights they grant to
this application. We answer this lack by selecting users who
use the third party application, are close to the current end-user
and share the same interests and close profile. We then present
the end-user with the list of the selected users.
The selection phase follows two steps:
• Close users  selection. Most users are connected to a
large  number  of  other  users.  Even  if  they  call  them
“friends” on Facebook, they may not actually know or
trust  them.  Some  social  networks,  such  as  tweeter,
encourage week links – users can “follow” each other or
share each other's messages. However, these links may
not denote a strong connection between users. Thus, we
select users close to a end-user by selecting the set of
users the end-users interacts and shares the most with,
be it by posting content to their profiles or exchanging
private  messages.  All  interactions  may  not  have  the
same significance. For instance “poking” on Facebook
is rather neutral and meaningless when frequent private
messages  show an  actual  relationship  between users.
Given a set of interactions I defined by I = {I1,...In},
each interaction is associated to a weight w, a positive
Fig. 12. Interface of our prototype
integer. The degree of interaction between users is given
by the  weighted  sum of  all  the  interactions  between
users. 
• Similar users selection. Among the users close to the
end-users, some users share the same tastes. These users
are especially important as the end-user is likely to use
the same applications as them. Given a set of interests –
for instance music or applications – and set of features –
age,  location,  etc.  –  the degree  of  similarity between
users  is  given by the number of  similar  interests  and
features they share.
VII. VALIDATION
A. Relevance of our prototype
We have tested our close users selection process on real-
world Facebook data. To do so, we have developed a Facebook
application which analyzes a user's friends list and retrieve the
user's  8  closest  and  most  similar  friends.  To  do  so,  the
application first selects the users a user interacts the most with.
To do so, the application accesses the user's inbox and analyzes
the messages the user posts to the profiles of other users. Then,
the application selects the users who share the more interests
with the current user.
In order to validate our work, we have selected 8 Facebook
users. Each of them is connected to more than 500 other users.
We have asked each user to use our application and to answer
following questions: 
• How many of the height selected people would you
call “close”?
• If these people used an application, would it help you
to trust the application?
At most, we were able to guess 8 actual close friends. At
worse, we guessed 5. All the users have answered that knowing
they close friends use an application helps them to trust  the
application. 
These results have helped use to attune the way we select
close  friends.  Even  though  we  have  only  submitted  our
approach to a limited amount of users, their answer confirms
what other surveys state and let us think that presenting users
with  social  information  when  they  install  third  party
applications is necessary.
B. Relevance of the proposed metamodel
The approach presented in this paper is an adaptation of the
approach  we have already proposed  in  [4].  In  this  previous
work, the authors described how to protect privacy in service
oriented architecture : privacy is defined at design level and a
service orchestration is generated to offer a secured and privacy
respectfull application. This first approach has been validated
on two main facets: response times and data protection. It has
been shown that response times are increased by only 1%, and
that it is not possible to access data without being controlled by
the proposed mechanism. 
The approach proposed in this paper being very close to the
previous one. It relies on the same principles. Data security is
the same. For instance, private pictures are protected because
all  requests  which  seek  to  retrieve  pictures  are rewritten  in
order to enforce access control.
However,  the response times might be influenced by the
languages we use in this new proposal and most of all by the
dependency  to  social  networks  performances.  The  tests  we
have driven show that Facebook requests are quite slow and it
takes 5 seconds to get all the needed data.
VIII. DISCUSSION AND FUTURE WORKS
Web apps users feel they lack control over their data. Most
of  them  do  not  trust  web  app  providers  when  it  comes  to
managing their data. Eventually, users lack tools and relevant
pieces of information to control the diffusion of their data. We
have tackled these issues in this paper. We brought in a model-
driven approach which allows user to compose web apps while
tuning an app's  access  rights  to a user's  data.  Our approach
empowers users with two level of control over their data. 
First of all, users can invoke any app. Nowadays, users can
only select apps registered with a provider, such as Facebook.
Our approach allows user to select any app implemented as a
Restful service – the widest used type of app. Users, which do
not possess technical expertise, do not have to produce code to
make  their  apps  interact.  We  rely  on  code  generation  to
produce the necessary code. Technical information can already
be harvested from APIs. In order to show the instantiation of
our metamodel, we have extracted the information from each
API by hand. However, works such as [9] underlines that APIs
can  be  easily  turned  self-descriptive  and  automatically
processed.  Such works ensure  that  our  automatic generation
process is actually feasible.
Our access control token generation allows to generate finer
access  control  than  current  access  control  tokens  in  web
applications
Then, we allow users to assess an app's trust and finely tune
its access rights to a dataset. This is currently impossible in all
the most famous web applications – such as social networks –
which  allow  users  to  install  third-party  applications.  When
users install third-party applications, they are not provided with
information – such as who uses the application. Furthermore,
the least privilege principle – which is fundamental in access
control – is not enforced on the web. Third-party apps request
access rights aend-users cannot but accept them if they want to
use the app. Our approach enables users to restrict the dataset
they  want  to  share  with  an  application  and  configure  the
lifetime of an app's access rights.
Our approach is implemented as a website to share a set of
resources – pictures, messages, etc. - among web applications.
This  website  demonstrates  the feasibility  of  our  work.  As a
preliminary validation step, we have presented our work to a
set of users. They all confirm that the pieces of information we
provide them is relevant and useful to trust web apps.
We do not aim at developing yet another web application.
We want to showcase what web technologies allows in terms of
privacy management. Our work shows that bringing together
well-mastered concepts such as model-driven engineering and
access control and current web technologies empowers users
with new means to control their data. As such, our work shows
that privacy requirements elicitation and management can be
processed more effectively with widely used technologies. Our
work  could  thus  be  easily  integrated  to  an  already  existing
application.
Our  approach  is  realistic  to  the  extent  that  their  already
exists web apps repositories  such as  programmableweb.com.
Users could select and invoke pretty much any app from such
repositories. Furthermore, enhancing existing applications with
privacy-conscious features is a growing trend. Blackphone.ch,
for instance, extends Android with communication cyphering
capabilities  when  secret.ly  proposes  to  share  without
communicating one's identity.
Our future works will deal with integrating our work with
existing apps and extending the range of privacy features we
offer. We will also test our work with a larger set of users.
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